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GEORGE J. ANNAS"
It is always a pleasure to speak to an academic audience, for that is
mostly what I do as a teacher. It is especially a pleasure to be here in Hart-
ford at the University of Connecticut where my best-ever student, Jay
Healey, taught for so many years and helped many students and profes-
sionals in this community and throughout the country. I am also pleased to
see Barbara Bletchner, who is continuing his tradition at the University of
Connecticut Medical School. I am going to talk about my favorite subject
today, and I thank the Law Review and Day, Berry & Howard for this op-
portunity.
The subject is law at the beginning and end of life. Most of my work is
in the area of general health law: law and medicine, public health law, and
health and human rights. But this is my favorite subject area, and I expect
you to ask me the hardest questions you can. I am not saying I can answer
them, but if I cannot that is my fault, not yours. I am going to make a
pretty broad argument today about law and medicine; specifically about
how new medical technology and medical practice standards have eclipsed
religion (and sometimes common sense) in the courts, and in our lives.
Medical technology so fascinates us that we often feel we are not in charge
of our lives and futures anymore. So we often do things simply because
they can be done; not because we have engaged in any societal debate to
decide they should be done.
Let me begin with two cartoons, since cartoonists have become our
most important social commentators. The first is of two men in heaven,
one saying to the other: "I had hate in my heart for doctors and lawyers, but
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apparently that was okay." And that is okay. The fact that you hate doc-
tors and lawyers would not make you unusual at all, as members of those
professions know. The second is of a scientist asking his fellow scientists:
"How about an ethics trifecta? We clone a human, induce sextuplets, and
assist in their suicides." It often seems that what is going on in both sci-
ence and medicine is a race to be first, complete with a public relations
packaging job designed to draw attention to the feat. Where should society
look for ethical guidance to navigate the new medicine? In the good old
days, when I was growing up, it is not too much of an exaggeration to say
that where you could go for answers was the Boy Scout Law. If we have
any old boy scouts here, you will remember that a scout is "trustworthy,
loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave,
clean, and reverent." What you probably did not realize is that this applies
directly to the doctor-patient relationship. The first six are what we all
want from our doctors. We want them to be trustworthy, loyal, helpful,
friendly, courteous and kind. The last six is what our doctors want from
us: obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean, and reverent. That used to be
all you needed to know about law and medicine. But things have changed,
and new medical technology has driven the changes.
I. MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND DEATH
Probably the most emblematic medical technology that has affected the
way we see ourselves is organ transplantation. When surgeons started do-
ing heart transplants late in 1967, one of the things that the law had to do
(and did not have much trouble doing it) was to redefine death. I do not
know if any of you remember, but in the good old days you were only dead
when your heart stopped beating. Taking a beating heart out of someone to
transplant would be first degree murder unless we had a new definition of
death. The new alternative definition was whole brain death, which was
developed and embraced very quickly in this country: a person is dead
when the heart has irreversibly stopped, or if there is no function of the
entire brain, including the brain stem. When society changes the definition
of death, you know this has a major impact on the way we think about life.
And it has: the brain is now recognized as the core of our "humanness."
Organ transplants also powerfully force us to confront issues of social
justice in resource allocation. We are still struggling with organ allocation,
especially the issue of who gets the next cadaver liver. Secretary of Health
and Human Services, Donna Shalala, for example, tried unsuccessfully to
set up a first-come, first-served national priority list based primarily on
how long you have been on the waiting list.' Transplant surgeons have,
1. Rachel Smolkin, Transplant Network Tries New Rules for Allocating Livers, PrTrSBUROII
PoST-GAZETrE Nov. 17, 2000, at A-9.
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however, so far been successful in keeping cadaver livers in their own re-
gion, and giving the next available liver to the person in their local geo-
graphic region they think is the sickest, and thus the most in need. This is a
decision about who lives and who dies, and how it is made remains contro-
versial.
The artificial heart was even more dramatic in its impact on how we
think. With the artificial heart it became clear that you did not need the
human heart to live. The mechanical heart posed new questions about the
future of human kind, whether we are going to be cyborgs: what it means
to be human, what it means to be of human-mechanical construction, and
whether we want to go in a mechanical/human amalgam direction. There
are few court cases involving organ transplants and implants, and most
judicial decisions simply endorse the new medical practice as defined by
physicians. Cases involving the beginning and end of life are even more
heavily tilted toward simple judicial endorsement of medical practice.
II. MEDICAL PRACrICE AND ABORTION
There is, for example, nothing like abortion to illustrate how American
courts have embraced medicine. The leading case, the 1973 ease of Roe v.
Wade,2 was written by Justice Harry Blackmun. Justice Blackmun, like
many judges, identified with physicians. As I am sure many of you know,
for ten years before his appointment to the bench, he served as general
counsel to the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. He said shortly be-
fore he died that those were the happiest days of his life. He also said that
he saw his job in writing Roe v. Wade as getting the law off the backs of
physicians. What he wrote in the opinion itself is stunning. "The decision
vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment ac-
cording to his professional judgment up to the points where important state
interests provide compelling justification for intervention," primarily the
point of fetal viability? And at the end of Roe, summarizing the holding,
he writes: "[T]he abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and pri-
marily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the
physician."4  Obviously, the opinion expanded the constitutional right of
privacy to include a right to terminate a pregnancy; but Blackmun seemed
more concerned about preventing legislatures from interfering with medi-
cal practice than about expanding the rights of women. This helps explain
both his emphasis on the physician, as well as the fetal viability line. Fetal
viability was chosen as the line after which the state could outlaw abortion
not because state legislators or judges thought this was a good line, but
2. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
3. Id. at 165-66.
4. Id.at 166.
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rather because physicians were increasingly viewing viability as an impor-
tant fetal event.
The idea that abortion is fundamentally a medical decision continues to
this day. If you read the 2000 "partial birth abortion" decision, for exam-
ple, you will see that the majority opinion, written by Justice Stephen
Breyer, reads like a medical textbook on abortion: what doctors do and
how doctors make decisions.' Justice Breyer recited the rule, as stated in
Roe v. Wade, that a state may outlaw abortion after the fetus is viable in
order to promote its interest in protecting potential human life, "'except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation
of the life or health of the mother."' 6 Breyer logically concluded that if
Roe requires an exception for the mother's health after fetal viability, it
must require one before viability, when the state has less of an interest in
protecting fetal life. Would the ban in fact adversely affect the health of
pregnant women who want to terminate their pregnancies? Breyer con-
cluded that it would, on the basis of the belief of "significant medical au-
thority" that "in some circumstances, D & X [dilation and extraction: the
method of abortion at issue in Stenberg] would be the safest procedure."
The conclusion follows easily: we cannot second-guess doctors
through legislation. We must permit doctors to do whatever it is doctors
do. The minority does not really try to argue that doctors should not de-
termine how to perform an abortion or which procedure is the safest. In-
stead the argument is that these are not doctors at all, but "abortionists."
Justices Clarence Thomas and Anthony Kennedy go out of their way to try
to marginalize physicians who perform abortions, arguing that this is not
about medicine, it is about something else.' The point is that the practice
of medicine is seen by the Court, at least the majority of the Justices, as the
constitutionally correct way to make especially difficult decisions involv-
ing abortion.
The Court always assumes, but seldom emphasizes, the hopefully ob-
vious: the woman's decision is central and her informed consent is re-
quired. The refusal of treatment cases, at the other end of life, make
autonomy central, but have been litigated primarily to protect physicians
rather than patients.
III. MEDICAL PRACTICE AND END-OF-LIFE DECISIONS
Karen Ann Quinlan is still probably the most famous patient in the his-
tory of the world, although Barney Clark, the first recipient of a permanent
5. See generally Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000).
6. Id. at 2604 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 164-65).
7. Id.at2610.
8. See George J. Annas, "Partial-Birth Abortion " and the Supreme Court, 344 NEW ENO, J. MED.
152, 154-55 (2001).
1278 CONNECTCUT LAW REVlEW (Vol. 33:1275
THE LIMIT3 OF LA WAT THE IM17 OF LIFE
artificial heart, is a close second. In Ms. Quinlan's case, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey in 1976 concluded that the two physicians who testi-
fied that removing Ms. Quinlan, a twenty-three-year-old who was in a per-
sistent vegetative state, from a ventilator was against medical ethics were
wrong. The court said that it did not believe them. The court did not call
them liars, but implied that these doctors were not telling the whole truth.
Nonetheless, instead of concluding that there was something nefarious go-
ing on, the court said that it understood why the doctors did not tell the
whole truth to the lower court judge. It is because they were afraid. They
were afraid of the law, especially of the criminal law (which is mostly what
I am going to talk about today) and this is why they would not take Ms.
Quinlan off the ventilator. The doctors refused not because they believed
that this young woman in a persistent vegetative state was benefiting from
treatment, or that she would want to stay on a ventilator if she could com-
municate. Rather, the doctors would not take her off the ventilator because
they were afraid of getting sued, or worse, of being accused of homicide."0
The court did not say: "Get out of here, go and do what is best for your
patient" Instead the court said, we understand your concern for yourself,
and we want to help you. What we will do is fix it so that you never have
to worry about legal liability again when making a decision like this. To
do this, the court recommended setting up an ethics committee at the hospi-
tal. Physicians could go to the ethics committee, and if the ethics commit-
tee agreed with the persistent vegetative state prognosis, then the physi-
cians could terminate the ventilator support with legal immunity." The
court noted that only judges have legal immunity in this country, and
agreed that it is dangerous to give legal immunity to anybody else; none-
theless the court thought it was appropriate to delegate immunity-granting
authority to a private and ill-defined ethics committee under these circum-
stances. No other court anywhere in the world has ever done anything like
that (and in New Jersey the only place that you could appeal that decision
is the New Jersey Supreme Court, and they are not going to change their
mind). It is striking and startling that New Jersey physicians can now ob-
tain prospective legal immunity for making a decision the judges thought
was both ethically and legally right.
Quinlan seems to have started a trend of physicians going to court for
approval and immunity before they act in controversial areas. Judges in
general hate to give declaratory judgments. They hate to make decisions
based on hypotheticals that may or may not happen in the future. But not
for physicians. For physicians, the courts almost have developed a tradi-
9. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,655-657,666-67 (NJ.), cert. denled 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
10. See id. at 666-69.
11. See ld. at 668-69. See also George J. Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewic= Dedslon
Makingfor the Terminally Ill Incompetent, 4 AM. .L. & MED. 367,377 (1979).
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tion since Quinlan of saying that if you are worried about liability and you
have a complicated case, you can come to us and we will decide whether
you get immunity (and we may even decide the merits of the case).
The case of Nancy Cruzan, a young woman in exactly the same state as
Karen Ann Quinlan except that she only required artificial feeding to con-
tinue to live, went to the United States Supreme Court. The Court had no
problem with the practice of going to court for a declaratory judgment of
the physician's liability. The Justices disagreed about whether Nancy Cm-
zan would have wanted her feeding tubes removed (concluding five to four
that Missouri could require that Nancy's intent be proven by clear and con-
vincing evidence), but they seemed to all agree that it was reasonable for
courts to help doctors out in complicated situations by making prospective
liability determinations.'
We have become so infatuated as a society with medicine that even
though suicide is one of the leading public health problems in our country,
and even though we do what we can to try to prevent people from commit-
ting suicide, many Americans nonetheless believe that if a physician helps
you kill yourself, suicide is a good thing. This idea became so ingrained in
the 90s that two cases came to the United State Supreme Court with what
was in retrospect an incredibly stupid argument: that there is (or should be)
a constitutional right to have a physician help you kill yourself.
The Supreme Court rightly unanimously rejected this argument, noting
that there is no constitutional right to commit suicide and therefore no con-
stitutional right to have assistance in committing suicide. 3 But the Court
did approve an alternative: physicians may drug patients that are in so
much pain that they must be rendered unconscious to relieve it, and there-
after it is legally acceptable to withdraw fluids and nutrition and in effect,
starve them to death. The Court essentially said that if physicians believed
this method, sometimes labeled "terminal sedation," is the only way to
relieve suffering at the end of life, then the action is lawful, and constitu-
tionally protected.' 4 That is a pretty amazing endorsement of medical prac-
tice. On the other hand, as long as what the doctor is doing is arguably the
best for the patient and with the patient's (or family's if the patient is not
competent) consent, this conclusion is consistent with past legal opinions
supporting medical practice.'
5
12. See generally Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
13. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705-06, 724-28 (1997); see also Vacco v. Quill, 521
U.S. 793, 796-97 (1997) (holding that the State of New York's prohibition on assisting suicide does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment).'
14. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 748-49 & n. 12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
15. For a more detailed discussion of these cases, see GEORGE J. ANNAS, SOME CHOICE: LAW,
MEDICINE, AND THE MARKET 224-45 (1998).
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IV. CONJOINED TWINS
What is going on here? I want to use the recent British case of the con-
joined twins to try to illustrate how far we have gone, and where we seem
to be going. Conjoined twins are oddities and have been the subject of
scientific exhibits, medical study and human curiosity. They are unusual.
The Lakeberg twins, for example, were born about eight years ago in illi-
nois, and the hospital in which they were born said that there was no
chance for either one to survive, and the best thing to do was to let them
both die. The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia saw it differently and
offered to try to separate them. So the parents took the children to Phila-
delphia. One died at surgery, which they had more or less known would
happen, and the other died a year later, at a cost of about two million dol-
lars. 6 That was a decision that was made by the parents, and it is basic
United States law that parents get to make difficult treatment decisions
about their children.'7
Ten years earlier, at that same hospital in Philadelphia, there was a
similar case. Dr. C. Everett Koop, the former United States Surgeon Gen-
eral, was the surgeon, and was afraid he would get sued for killing one of
the children during a separation operation. 8 He asked the local district
attorney what to do. The couple with the conjoined twins who shared a
heart were Jewish, so they talked to their rabbi. The nurses were Catholic,
so they talked to their priest. The priest said you could fit separation of
conjoined twins into the principle of double effect (in a sense, what the
United States Supreme Court said when it determined it was lawful to pre-
scribe enough drugs to a patient to keep the patient out of pain, even if the
drugs hastened the patient's death). To oversimplify, the double effect is
that if an act has both a good and an evil effect, as long as you do not in-
tend the evil effect, but only the good effect, and the good effect does not
come directly from the evil effect (and there is proportionality between the
good effect and the evil effect), then the act is licit. The priest argued that
although separating the twins would kill one twin, she would not be killed
intentionally or directly, but rather she would die indirectly from the le-
gitimate treatment of the other twin. I do not find that terribly persuasive,
but the double effect worked for them.
The rabbi I think was more helpful. The two examples that the rab-
binical scholars have found useful were used by all three judges in the Brit-
ish case that I am about to talk about. The first involves a caravan in the
16. See generally David C. Thomasma et al., The Ethics of Caring for Conjoined 7kTgs: The Lake-
berg Twins, 26(4) HASTINGS CENTER REP. 4 (1996).
17. Jennifer L Rosato, Using Bioethis Discourse to Determine When Parents Should Make Health
Care Decisionsfor Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEIMPLE L REV. 1, 6-7 (2000).




middle of the desert that is attacked by bandits, and the bandits demand a
particular person or they will destroy the caravan. The caravan can send
out the person demanded, even though they know the bandits are going to
kill him, because the person has been "designated for death." In the other
example, two people parachute from a plane and only one of their para-
chutes opens. The other parachuter grabs the leg of the person whose para-
chute opened to try to save himself. It would be moral for the man with the
open parachute to kick the other man off if the parachute was not strong
enough for both to survive, because the person whose parachute did not
open was "designated for death." And so the argument followed that the
weaker of the two conjoined twins, the twin who was least likely to sur-
vive, was designated for death, and therefore it was morally acceptable
(although not required) to do the separation operation. With that back-
ground, and that is about all the background there is, we come to the case
of the couple from Malta who came to England to give birth to what they
knew would be conjoined twins.
V. THE CONJOINED TWINS FROM GOZO19
The conjoined twins that were the subject of two British court deci-
sions are Jodie and Mary, the children of Michaelangelo and Rina Attard of
the Maltese island of Gozo. The couple, who are Roman Catholic, came to
England for medical care at about five-months gestation, and the conjoined
twins were born on August 8, 2000. The children were joined at the pelvis,
their spinal columns on the same axis, with each having two arms and two
legs. The physicians saw no hope of the twins surviving for more than a
year if they remained joined, but believed that if Mary (the weakest of the
two and whose continued survival depended on sharing Jodie's circulatory
system) was separated from Jodie, Mary would die, but Jodie would sur-
vive and do well. The parents refused to consider authorizing the separa-
tion on the basis that it was wrong to choose between the lives of their two
innocent children, and also contrary to their religious beliefs. Physicians
have historically honored the wishes of parents in cases like this.2" In this
case, however, the physicians decided to go to court to obtain authority to
proceed with the separation over the objections of the parents.
In the United States, the decision of the parents would be final unless
the physicians or the state could persuade a judge that this was a case of
child neglect.2 In England the law is different: once a case is placed be-
fore a judge, the judge must decide what the "welfare" or "best interests"
of the child requires by exercising "an independent and objective judg-
19. Sections V through IX were previously published in substantial part, in George J. Annas, Con-
joined Twins: The Limits of Law at the Limits ofLife, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1104 (2001).
20. James A. O'Neill, Conjoined Twins, in PEDIATRIC SURGERY 1925, 1925-38 (5th cd. 1998).
21. See Rosato, supra note 17, at 6-9.
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ment." The parent's wishes are just one piece of evidence to be considered
in making this determination. The trial court judge concluded that separa-
tion was in the best interests of both children, and that separation was not a
case of killing Mary but one of passive euthanasia in which her food and
hydration was being withdrawn (by clamping off her blood supply from
Jodie). The parents and the official solicitor appointed to represent Mary
appealed.
Each of the three judges on the appeals panel issued a separate opinion,
as is customary in English courts. Although all of the judges agreed with
the trial court judge that the separation should be done, none agreed with
the legal reasoning of the trial court, and none of the judges fully agreed
with the others' legal reasoning.' There are many reasons for this, includ-
ing the unprecedented nature of the dispute itself, reliance on analogies that
do not quite fit, and a strong desire to authorize physicians to do what they
think is best for their newborn patients.
VI. JUSTICE WARD'S OPINION2
Justice Ward began his analysis by noting that this "truly is a unique
case" that "[i]n a nutshell" involves killing the weaker twin, Mary (who
would not have been viable had she been a singleton) to "give Jodie a life
which will be worthwhile."'24 Ward describes the physical condition of the
twins in detail, quoting from physician reports that document, among other
things, that Jodie "has an anatomically normal brain, heart, lungs and
liver," that she is expected to be of "normal intelligence" and "appears to
be a bright little girl." 6 Mary, on the other hand, is described by physi-
cians as "severely abnormal," having a "primitive" brain, a very poorly
functioning heart, and the absence of lung tissue.27 Ward concludes that
Mary is incapable of surviving separately: "She lives on borrowed time, all
of which is borrowed from Jodie. It is a debt she can never repay."'  He
continues by noting that separation will cause Mary's death (which the
physicians believe will be quick and painless), and that a heart-lung trans-
plant for Mary (again, according to the physicians) is not an option.
Justice Ward then turns to the question of why the court is involved at
all, noting that although "every instinct of the medical team has been to
save life where it can be saved," it would have been "perfectly acceptable"
22. See In re A, 4 All E.R. 961 (C.A. 2000).
23. See Annas, supra note 19, at 1104-05.
24. In re A, 4 All E.R. at 969 (Ward, U.).
25. Id. at 973.
26. Id. at 973, 974.
27. Id. at 975.
28. Id. at 976.
29. Id. at 982-84.
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for the medical team and hospital to have acquiesced in the parental refusal
even though this would have resulted in the death of both twins." But
seeking court authorization for surgery is also acceptable in Ward's view
because:
Here sincere professionals could not allay a collective medical
conscience and see children in their care die when they know one
was capable of being saved. They could not proceed in the ab-
sence of parental consent. The only arbiter of that sincerely held
difference of opinion is the court. Deciding disputed matters of life
and death is surely and pre-eminently a matter for a court of law
to judge.
3'
In analyzing existing law, Ward strongly disagrees with the trial court,
saying that it is "utterly fanciful" to classify the operation as "an omis-
sion," and that there is no way that killing Mary can be "in Mary's best
interests." '32 Instead he concludes that the only proper legal path when
there is a conflict of interest between conjoined twins is to choose "the
lesser of two evils. '33 Ward condemns the parents' refusal to choose life
for Jodie in dramatic terms:
In my judgment, parents who are placed on the horns of such a ter-
rible dilemma simply have to choose the lesser of their inevitable
loss. If a family at the gates of a concentration camp were told
they might free one of their children but if no choice were made
both would die, compassionate parents with equal love for their
twins would elect to save the stronger and see the weak one des-
tined for death pass through the gates.'
He goes on to say, "my heart bleeds for them. But... it is I who must now
make the decision." '35
The decision, of course, seems to have been dictated by the description
of the physical condition of the two twins. But it still must be legally justi-
fied. Ward does this by accusing Mary of killing Jodie, and thus making a
decision to kill her justifiable homicide, a case of "quasi self-defense."
3 6
"Mary may have a right to life, but she has little right to be alive. She is
alive because.., she [parasitically] sucks the lifeblood out of Jodie.... If
Jodie could speak, she would surely protest, 'Stop it, Mary, you're killing
me.' ' 37 Ward concludes that the physicians have a legal duty to Jodie
30. Id. at 987.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 1003.
33. Id. at 1006.
34. Id. at 1009-10.
35. Id. at 1010.
36. Id. at 1017.
37. Id. at I010.
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which gives them an obligation to act, and that "doctors cannot be denied a
right of choice if they are under a duty to choose.' 38
VII. JUSTICE ROBERT BROOKE39
Justice Brooke horrified the parents when, in open court, he looked at
pictures of the twins and asked: "What is this creature in the eyes of the
law?" His opinion, however, is more analytical. He agrees with Ward's
family law analysis, but believes more is required to persuasively conclude
that the operation which will kill Mary is lawful. The official solicitor,
who opposed the separation, suggested nonetheless that the court might
wish to develop new law that permitted such an operation if it was "propor-
tionate and necessary" and "approved in advance by the court.' " Brooke
essentially adopts this as a reasonable approach and spends much of his
opinion exploring the legal doctrine of necessity.
The major case he examines is the famous case of Regina v. Dudley &
Stephens," an 1884 case which involved shipwreck and survival on the
high seas by means of murder and cannibalism. In that case a crew of four
was sailing the yacht Mignonette from England to Australia when the ship
came apart in a storm in the South Atlantic 2,000 miles from reachable
land. The crew escaped in a lifeboat with only two tins of turnips. After
19 days the three senior members of the crew killed 17-year-old Richard
Parker, the youngest and weakest member of the crew, and ate him in order
to survive. They later explained that the point of killing him before he died
naturally was to be able to drink his blood.4 After being rescued and re-
turned to England they Were arrested and tried for murder, which they did
not deny. Their defense was "necessity." The British courts rejected this
defense, noting among other things that the boy did not threaten the rest of
the crew, and that the law could not justify choosing the "unoffending and
unresisting boy" to die, "the weakest, the youngest, the most unresisting..
. Was it more necessary to kill him than one of the grown men? The an-
swer must be 'No."'"
Although rejected by British law, Brooke suggests there may be cir-
cumstances in which the necessity defense should be allowed. He gives
several examples. The first is the case of a mountain climber who must cut
38. Id. at 1015.
39. See Annas, supra note 19, at 1105.
40. Kevin Cullen, In London. An Agonzing Decision, BOSTON GLOaBE, Sept. 11, 2000, at Al,
LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File.
41. In reA,4 All E.R. at 1031 (Brooke, LJ.).
42. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
43. See A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW: THE STORY OF THETRAGIC
LAST VOYAGE OFTHEMIGNONEITE AND THE STRANGE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS TO WHICH IT GAVE RISE
57-58, 67-68 (1984).
44. In reA, 4 All E.R. at 1037 (Brooke, L.) (discussing Dudley & Stephens).
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the rope holding another climber who has fallen, otherwise both will per-
ish. The next is the sinking of a British ferry, Herald of Free Enterprises,
near Zeebrugge in which almost 200 passengers drowned. An army corpo-
ral said that he and dozens of other people were in the water near the foot
of a rope ladder and all in danger of drowning. Their route to safety was
blocked by a young man on the ladder who was paralyzed with fear and
unable to move. Eventually the corporal ordered that the man be pushed
off the ladder so that the others could climb to safety.45 As I mentioned,
two other examples had been suggested by a rabbinical scholar who coun-
seled a Jewish couple considering a similar operation on their conjoined
twins who shared a single heart in the United States in 1977, and Brooke
describes these as well.46
Many more legal authorities are quoted at length, but ultimately Justice
Brooke concludes that the Dudley case is distinguishable because neither of
the objections to the necessity defense presented there are applicable to the
twins case (who can judge this sort of necessity, and how can the compara-
tive value of lives be measured?) because "Mary is, sadly, self-designated
for a very early death."47 He also thinks there is no danger of the necessity
defense being misused by physicians in other conjoined twins cases be-
cause "there will be in practically every case the opportunity for the doc-
tors to place the relevant facts before a court for approval (or otherwise)
before the operation is attempted." '48
VIII. JUSTICE ROBERT WALKER4 9
Justice Walker opens his opinion by describing this case as "tragic"
and "unprecedented anywhere in the world."50 Although conjoined twins
are unique, Walker insists:
[T]here is no longer any place in the legal textbooks, any more
than there is in the medical textbooks, for expressions (such as
'monster') which are redolent of superstitious horror. Such dispar-
agingly emotive language should never be used to describe a hu-
man being, however disabled or dysmorphic.5"
He nonetheless concludes that continued life joined to Jodie would "confer
no benefit [on Mary] but would be to her disadvantage."52 Walker agrees
with Brooke that the question of whether Mary can be lawfully killed for
45. Id. at 1041.
46. Id. at 1041-42.
47. Id. at 1051.
48. Id. at 1052.
49. See Annas, supra note 19, at 1106.
50. In reA, 4 All E.R. at 1052 (Walker, L.J.).
51. Id. at 1054.
52. Id. at 1057.
1286 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1275
2001] THE LIMIS OF L4WAT THE LIMITS OFLIFE 1287
Jodie's sake rests on the issues of intention and necessity. Like Brooke he
reviews a series of analogies, but unlike him, Walker concludes that "there
is no helpful analogy or parallel to... this case."'
Ultimately Walker determines that doctors owe conflicting duties to
the two twins. Nonetheless, he believes the dilemma does not involve
choosing "the relative worth of two human lives," but rather "undertaking
surgery without which neither life will have the bodily integrity (or whole-
ness) which is its due." ' He believes having her "bodily integrity," if only
for a few seconds, is a benefit to Mary.SS He concludes that physicians
would separate the twins not with the intent of killing Mary, but with the
intent of making each twin whole and acting in both their best interests.
What seems to persuade Walker the most, however, is the testimony of the
physicians: "[H]ighly skilled and conscientious doctors believe that the
best course, in the interests of both twins, is to undertake elective surgery
in order to separate them and save Jodie."'
IX. AFTERMATH
s5
The twins were separated six weeks after the opinion was issued5
Controversy continued after the opinion over which of two surgical teams,
the one with more experience, or the one that brought the case to court,
should perform the surgery.59 It was finally performed by the less experi-
enced team. The physicians involved later told the press that they were
worried about being prosecuted for murder for killing Mary, and that is
why they sought court approval.' They continued to believe that separa-
tion was in the best interests of both twins (although it caused Mary's
death), and when the fmal blood vessels that connected the twins were cut
in the separation operation, an act that would result in the death of Mary,
the two lead surgeons said they cut the blood vessels together, in silence
and with "great respect." The coroner recorded a narrative verdict, stating
simply that Mary died "following surgery separating her from her con-
joined twin, which surgery was permitted by an order of the High Court,
53. Id. at 1066.
54. Id. at 1067.
55. Id. at 1070.
56. Id. at 1069.
57. See Annas.supra note 19, at 1106.
58. Sandra Laville, Mary Was Freed by Death, Says Father of Siamese Thins, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(LONDON), Dec. 7,2000, at 1, LEXIS, News Library, Telegr File.
59. See Lewis Spitz & Edward Kiely, Success Rate for Surgery of Conjoined ThIns, 356 THE
LANCEr 1765 (2000).
60. British Surgeon Reflects on Decision To Let Siamese Thin Die, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 7, 2001,
LEXIS, News Library. Tstar File.
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confirmed by the Court of Appeal."'" The opinion of the appeals court has
been praised. Jodie is doing well and may soon go home to Gozo, al-
though she will require extensive surgery over the next five years or more.
Mary was buried in Gozo in January. 3
X. PROBLEMS WITH THE LEGAL ANALYSIS AND ANALOGIES"
It is easy to see why all the judges involved characterized this case as
"unique" and hoped that it would not set a precedent. This is because the
case seems not to have been decided on the law (which most of the judges
found of little help), but more on an intuitive judgment that the state of
being a conjoined twin is a disease, and that separation is the indicated
treatment for it, at least if it affords one of the twins a chance to live alone.
The judges identified strongly with the physicians and had little empathy
with the parents or their religious beliefs. All of this, I think, led each
judge to make problematic legal statements.
Justice Ward is the hardest on the parents, using the Sophie's Choice
analogy of a parent at the gates of a concentration camp."' The Nazi physi-
cian in charge of selecting who is to go to the gas chambers immediately,
and who can do labor or be used in medical experiments, tells Sophie that
both her children will be killed if she does not choose one to save. 1 Justice
Ward insists that a parent in this situation "must" choose. Sophie, of
course, did choose, although she ultimately lost both children to the Nazis,
and killed herself because she was unable to live with her forced decision.
Ward's analogy, at the heart of his analysis, is troubling in at least two
respects. The first is his conclusion that parents must choose which child
will die when only one can be saved. We would not condemn a parent for
making this terrible choice, but neither should we condemn a parent for
refusing to make it. For example, if a father jumps from a burning plane
holding two children, one in each arm, and on the way down he loses his
grip on both, and knows that he will drop them both if he does not drop one
to save the other, we would not fault him for doing this. Neither, I believe,
should we fault a parent for refusing to choose and trying to hang on to
both for as long as possible. Second, and more disturbing in the concentra-
tion camp example, is the question of who the judge thinks is in the role of
the Nazi physician. Ward concludes that it is the British physicians who
61. Nigel Bunyan, 'Bright and Alert'Jodie Makes Rapid Progress, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON),
Dec. 16,2000, at 9, LEXIS, News Library, Telegr File.
62. Alexander McCall Smith, The Separating of Conjoined Twins: A Human Life Has the Greatest
Value, But its Loss May Be Justified, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 782 (2000).
63. Auslan Cramb, Village Children Mourn as Siamese Twin is Laid to Rest, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(LONDON), Jan. 20,2001, at 3, LEXIS, News Library, Telegr File.
64. See Annas, supra note 19, at 1106-07.
65. See In re A, 4 All E.R. 961, 1009-10 (C.A. 2000) (Ward, L.J.).
66. See WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE'S CHOICE 589-90 (Bantam Books 1983).
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should be given the right of choice,6' but he also seems to place himself in
that role saying, "it is I who must now make the decision." Of course,
Ward is not choosing to kill both twins, and perhaps he sees nature as the
Nazis. Nonetheless, it is unsettling to see a British judge rely on what
might be termed "concentration camp ethics" to reach his decision.
Justice Ward is not much stronger on the law. He insists, for example,
that the law requires him to do what is in the best interests of the children,'
and that British law prohibits the use of the doctrine of substituted judg-
ment (determining what an incompetent person would decide if they were
capable of making a decision).7 Nonetheless, his primary argument turns
out to be basically a substituted judgment one: in colorful language he lik-
ens Mary to a parasite who is "poisoning" Jodie and sucking out her "life-
blood." He knows what Jodie would decide if she could decide: "If Jodie
could speak, she would surely protest, 'Stop it, Mary, you're killing me.""'
But the problem with using substituted judgment for very young children is
that we have no way to know what they would say, and tend to speculate
based on our own adult values. For example, Jodie could equally well say
to her identical and attached twin, "I love you as myself, and will do every-
thing, including sacrificing my life, to keep you alive as long as possible."
Likewise, Mary might reasonably say to Jodie, "You are my identical tAn,
and I love you, so I am willing to die so you can live since this is the only
chance there is for my genes to be transmitted to the next generation."
Each twin might also, of course, consider the other twin a part of"me" that
should not be amputated. Any of these hypotheses is plausible, but made
up dramatic monologues cannot take the place of legal analysis.
Justice Brooke's opinion is also problematic because he did not give
himself the time needed to properly deal with the analogies he uses. His
reliance on the necessity defense, for example, is based almost exclusively
on the two analogies he describes that were reportedly adopted by a rabbi
in counseling a Jewish couple similarly situated in Philadelphia in 1977:
the men jumping from the burning plane, and the caravan surrounded by
bandits.7 In each, the necessity defense is said to be appropriate because
the person killed was "designated for death," a phrase Brooke adopts as his
primary justification for killing Mary to save Jodie. In fact, he goes fur-
ther, concluding, "Mary is, sadly, self-designated for a very early death."
There are two problems with this conclusion. First, Mary did not des-
ignate herself for anything, she was simply born and survived. But even
67. InreA,4AllE.Rat 1016Q(Vard, L.).
68. Id. at 1010.
69. Id. at 993-94.
70. Id. at 999.
71. Id. at 1010.
72. Id. at 1022, 1041-42 (Brooke, Li.).
73. Id. at 1051.
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the "designated for death" label alone may not be a proper reading of the
two analogies. The description of the two analogies was drawn by the
court from an article I wrote in 1987, and I used a 1977 newspaper report
as my own source.74 More important than what might have been lost in the
retelling, however, is that expert commentary on these examples has since
been published, and the court seems unaware of it.
A leading United States rabbinical authority, Rabbi J. David Bleich,
has written that these two analogies are not properly characterized as "des-
ignated for death" cases.' Instead, the parachutist case is better thought of
as a "pursuer" case, in which kicking off the falling man is justified by the
fact that his intentional actions will kill you. In the second example, Rabbi
Bleich argues that the caravan is justified in turning over the named person
only if that person is guilty of having committed some crime; if the person
is innocent, he may not be turned over to a certain death. 6 It has been sug-
gested elsewhere that a group similarly-situated could lawfilly agree to use
a random device, like drawing straws, to pick who would be sacrificed for
the good of the group.'
Rabbi Bleich does, nonetheless, offer Justice Brooke another possible
justification for his conclusion. Bleich believes that there may be excep-
tional circumstances in which one conjoined twin can be judged a pursuer
of the other: "If the heart can be shown to belong to one twin exclusively,
the second is, in effect, a parasite... [and having] no claim to the heart, is
then quite literally a pursuer.... ."s Pursuers must be stopped before they
kill, and self-defense would have provided Brooke with a much sounder
rationale for his conclusion than the "designated for death" approach.
Justice Walker's opinion is, I think, most notable in trying (but failing)
to consider the conjoined twins as simultaneously a single entity and two
persons. Walker wants to outlaw the use of terms like "monster" (and
probably "creature" as well) to describe conjoined twins.79 Nonetheless, he
speaks of them not as one entity, but as two separate "innocent human be-
ings" and believes the court must consider the welfare of each.8" The prob-
lem is that once the twins are separated verbally, it is only a matter of time
before they will be separated surgically: Walker sees these conjoined twins
as a serious, lethal anomaly that must be medically corrected so that at least
one of the twins can appear normal. In this regard Walker seems correct in
74. George . Annas, Siamese Twins: Killing One to Save the Other, 17(2) HASTINGS CENTER R'T.
27, 27, 29 (1987). See also Drake, supra note 18; Thomasma et al., supra note 16, at 8.
75. See 3. David Bleich, Conjoined Wns, 31 TRADITION 92, 100-02 (1996).
76. Id. at 100-101.
77. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 618, 621-26
(1949). See generally Symposium, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: A Fiftieth Anniversary
Symposium, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1834 (1999).
78. Bleich, supra note 75, at 102.
79. In re A, 4 All E.R 961, 1054 (C.A. 2000) (Walker, L.J.).
80. Id.
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concluding, "[i]n truth there is no helpful analogy or parallel to the [cur-
rent] situation." He thus seems to find the condition of being a conjoined
twin itself adequate justification for separation, at least when one could live
if the other was killed. That is why he can conclude, with the physicians,
the trial court judge (and Justice Brooke), that separation would be in the
best interests of both children. Stated another way, three of the four judges
believed Mary was better off dead than continuing to live for a few months
as a conjoined twin.
XI. LESSONS FROM CONJOINED TWIN DECISION MAKING"'
Perhaps the most important lesson of the case of Jodie and Mary is that
there are severe limits to judicial decision making in complex life and
death decision making. The most important shortcoming of this decision is
that there is no legal principle on which the decision of thesejudges rested.
That is why if an identical case was presented tomorrow to the Great Or-
mond Street Hospital for Children, the physicians there could, under the
rationale of this case (and contrary to its conclusion), decide to follow the
wishes of the parents and let both twins die. The conclusion of Justice
Ward that it would have been "perfectly acceptable" for physicians to de-
cide either way must be wrong: if Mary is a pursuer who is killing Jodie,
saving Jodie's life (and others in her situation) by killing Mary must be
mandatory. The court's rule, that physicians can do whatever they think is
best (with the court's prior approval), is no legal rule at all. Nor is it true
that there will almost always be ample time to seek court review in cases
like this.82
Closely related is the question of the court's role in similar cases: is it
to determine whether a particular course of action, chosen by both parents
and physician, is legally permissible, or is it to determine if a particular
medical intervention is required by law? The first role seems reasonable,
the second seems justified only in cases where failure to act (on the part of
either parent or physician) is child neglect. In this regard, had Jodie been a
singleton, the parents might well have been justified in refusing to consent
to three or more years of heroic surgical procedures with an uncertain out-
come on the basis that they did not believe the burdens of these interven-
tions to Jodie could be justified by the expected outcome to her even if the
81. See Annas, supra note 19, at 1108.
82. Errol R. Norwitz et al., Separation of Conjoined Twins %th the Twin Revmed-Artial-
Perfusion Sequencing After Prenatal Planning vdth Three-Dimensional Modeling, 343 NEW am. J.
MED. 399, 400-01 (2000) (describing the situation where immediate surgical i-paration at birth is
necessary to save even one of the conjoined twins).
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physician believed the operations were in her best interests. 3
My own view is that in this case it would have been better for the phy-
sicians not to have sought court intervention, and if they did, for the trial
court to have refused to hear this case and to have instructed the physicians
that they must obtain the consent of the parents before doing the separation
procedure. I would have liked to see the parents agree to the separation
(since giving Jodie a chance to live at the cost of cutting Mary's life short
does seem the lesser of two evils), but I do not believe the case for separa-
tion is so strong that it demands that the authority to make the decision
about the medical treatment of their children should be taken away from
the parents.
XII. MEDICINE AND MIRACLES
I am getting near the end. My message today is that I believe judges
specifically and we as a society generally are replacing religion with medi-
cine and science, and I hope I have provided examples that illustrate this
trend. When we talk about medical miracles we really mean it. We do not
mean medical miracles metaphorically anymore. Even the Catholic
Church over twenty-five years ago made a policy decision that the only
miracles that count now for sainthood are medical miracles. The commit-
tee that must decide whether a cure is "scientifically inexplicable" is a
committee of physicians." Their judgment is necessary, although not suf-
ficient, to have a cure placed in the miracle bin.85
We seem to literally believe that doctors should be able to make life
and death decisions for us, and if they want to go to court that is fine be-
cause courts almost uniformly bless whatever they want to do. Courts have
also adopted the double effect, an old religious doctrine, as legal doctrine.
It is now legal doctrine in the United States. Actually the double effect
makes sense, especially in extreme cases like Quinlan and Cruzan. And
how else could it be? If you did not have the doctrine of the double effect
(or its functional equivalent), every time someone died on the operating
table, that would be homicide because the surgeon killed a person. But we
do not hold the patient's death against surgeons if their intent is to try to
help the patient and they act in a medically reasonable and prudent manner,
nor should we.
If we believed that all that mattered was the outcome of the doctor's
decision (and not intent or causation), stopping cardiopulmonary resuscita-
83. In re T, I All E.R. 906, 916 (CA. 1997) (holding that a liver transplant for a child may be
refused if the parents believe the transplant is not in their child's interests, though the physicians dis-
agree).
84. KENNETH L. WOODARD, MAKING SAINTS: How THE CATHOLIC CHURCH DETERMINES WHO
BECOMES A SAINT, WHO DOES NOT, AND WHY 205-07 (1990).
85. Id. at 205-06.
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tion (CPR) would be murder (or at least manslaughter) because the patient
would die at that point, when the physician stopped compressing their
heart. But of course that is silly. We do not even think about homicide, or
other criminal charges, because we understand that the goal of CPR is to
try to revive the patient's spontaneous heartbeat and respiration. When that
goal cdnnot be met, it is only reasonable to stop, even though the patient
dies. It does not mean the physician killed the patient. Barney Clark, the
recipient of the world's first artificial heart, was given a key (actually he
was supposed to be given a key, but he never got it) so that he could turn
off the artificial heart anytime he wanted out of the experiment. One ques-
tion that was brought up was, would it be suicide for Barney to turn off his
artificial heart? I will leave it to you to think about that, but obviously
Clark's act would not be illegal.
How has medicine gotten such a hold on the judiciary that judges au-
thorize and promote almost whatever doctors want done, even if the judges
must use analogies to the Nazis, people jumping out of airplanes, and mon-
sters, to authorize physicians to do what they want to do? I think it is be-
cause of the power that physicians have over our lives, and the power sci-
ence and medical technology has over our lives, and our hope that medi-
cine and science will get even more powerful. We used to believe (some
still do) that we are going to get more life after death, we will get our re-
ward in heaven. That view is not so popular now. Now we are not going
to die. Forget that death stuff. Society's real agenda for medicine now
seems to be to help us live forever, or at least to one hundred and fifty.
And if virtual immortality on earth is our goal, medicine quite naturally
replaces religion in our lives.
It also seems to follow that if physicians have the key to immortality,
then physicians (not judges) should determine what is criminal and what is
not in the medical realm: medicine, surgery, research, and whatever else
might keep us alive longer. And almost every court, whether it is about
abortion, about separating conjoined twins, or about "terminal sedation,"
has adopted the view that physicians' practices should be honored. The
bottom line is that what physicians think is the right thing to do has consis-
tently been legally protected by judges.
Let me conclude by asking (if this is true, or even close to true): can a
physician-centered judicial ethic serve a society in which the potential for
more medicinal power seems almost unlimited in our new genetic age?
XIII. SPECIES-LEVEL DECISIONS
My own view is that we can no longer rely on judges to be the gate-
keepers or the arbiters of what medicine can or cannot do to people. It is
one thing to permit physicians and their patients to make decisions that
only or almost only affect the individual patient. But if decisions can affect
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the entire human species, deferential judicial blessing is woefully inade-
quate.
Historically, it has seemed that international human rights law and
medical ethics are similar in that both are universal and both are unen-
forceable. This remains true of medical ethics, but I no longer think it is
true of international human rights law. We can take human rights seriously
and protect, promote, and enforce them. This requires coalition-building.
For example, the human rights community can work with the humanitarian
community, the women's rights community, the labor movement, the con-
sumer movement, and the environmental community on common agendas.
Such a coalition can have a significant impact on even an international
level. The movement toward a permanent Nuremberg, an international
criminal court, for example, is, I think, not stoppable. 6 I also believe that
doctors and lawyers can and should work together on the international
level to protect and promote human rights, especially human rights and
health. 7 I think the first agenda must be income redistribution and care of
poor people. 8 This has special relevance in medical research. We spend
ninety percent of our research dollars on diseases that affect only ten per-
cent of humanity. Of course, we in the United States virtually ignore dis-
eases like malaria and TB that affect most of the rest of the world's popula-
tion. Our research agenda must change and we should work to ensure that
the benefits of medical research are equitably distributed.
The human rights community has helped define and works to prevent
crimes against humanity: murder, torture, slavery, genocide, being the pri-
mary examples. It does not matter that your government permits slavery,
or that your government permits murdering ethnic minorities. It is a crime.
We have decided that as a species. A related question is: are there crimes
against humanity qua humanity? Specifically, are there ways science and
medicine could change the nature of the human species itself that should be
considered a crime? Would it be wrong for any individual scientist or
doctor or researcher to attempt to alter a fundamental characteristic of what
is means to be a human being or to put humanity at risk of a new lethal
disease?
The new medicine and the new genetics offer us new perspectives on
this. Xenografis have the risk (small but real) of letting loose another vi-
rus, like the AIDS virus, that could kill millions of human beings. Who
has the moral authority to say for all members of the human species, who
are at risk for such a virus, that scientists and physicians should go ahead
86. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT. LJ. 443 (1999).
87. With Michael A. Grodin, M.D., I co-founded Global Lawyers and Physicians: Working To-
gether for Human Rights to pursue this agenda. Visit our website www.glphr.org for more information.
88. For more on this topic, see George J. Annas, Book Review: The Rich Have More Money, 5
HEALTH & HUM. RTs. 180(2000).
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with pig heart transplants because it could save lives, even though it could
put the whole human species at risk? Who has the moral authority to de-
cide that since we can clone sheep, we should attempt to clone humans if
someone wants a clone? Who should make that decision and how should it
be made? Suppose we could enhance memory in mice, should we try to
enhance memory in our children? Should we try to genetically enhance the
abilities of our future children by altering the genetics of embryos? Should
we try to create a race of "super humans," humans who in a couple of gen-
erations we may not even recognize as human, or more likely who won't
recognize us as human? Should we try to engineer perfect people? How
do we make that decision? Who gets to make that decision? We do not
have a global mechanism to make decisions like this that impact all mem-
bers of the human species. 9
The only mechanism we now seem to be able to imagine to govern the
new medicine is the judiciary as it has been used in the conjoined twins
case, the Quinlan case, and the abortion cases, and letting a judge deter-
mine if it is okay. But species-altering and species-endangering decisions
are far beyond the competence of the judiciary. Historically, judges re-
fused to even make decisions that only affected the patient in a doctor-
patient relationship. They used to throw doctors out of court. They would
say in effect, "go back and talk to your patient and you two work it out."
In the last forty years, of course, judges have come to decide virtually
every medical or scientific case that comes before of them. But, their ex-
pertise and social role has not correspondingly expanded. Admittedly,
most judges do say the legislature should make many of these types of de-
cisions. But if the legislatures do not, judges will. Obviously, individual
legislatures cannot make decisions for the whole world either.
We need a new democratically based organization to determine if spe-
cies-altering or species-endangering human experiments should be con-
ducted. No individual scientist or corporation has the moral or social war-
rant to conduct such an experiment, and no judge has the moral or social
warrant to approve such an experiment. No individual physician, judge or
legislature should be empowered to decide for all of us. We really do need
to build an international structure to discuss these issues, and an interna-
tional body to review and approve or disapprove proposals to conduct such
experiments. And we really do need an international criminal court to en-
force the rules set by the international body.
Let me end with a quotation from Vaclav Havel: "Without a global
revolution in the sphere of human consciousness, nothing will change for
89. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see George . Annas The Man on the Moon.
Immortality, and Other Millennial Myths: The Prospects and Perils of Human Genetic Engineering, 49
EMORY i. 753 (2000).
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the better in the sphere of our being." 90 Havel continues by noting that
"[w]e are still a long way from that 'family of man' .... Interests of all
kinds-personal, selfish, state, nation, group, and, if you like, company
interests-still considerably outweigh genuinely common and global inter-
ests." 91
It is time, I think past time, to start thinking globally and acting glob-
ally by engaging in a species-wide conversation about what it means to be
human, what the important qualities of humanhood are, how we can pre-
serve them as we go forward with our new medicine and our new genetics.
We must decide on a species level what species-altering and species-
endangering experiments should and should not be done, rather than letting
medical and scientific technocrats decide what can be done, whether or not
their plans are blessed by the local judiciary. Nothing less than the survival
of the species may depend on how we act now to control ourselves.
90. Text of Havel's Speech to Congress, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1990, at A28 (detailing an address
by Czech Republic President Vaclav Havel to a joint session of Congress).
91. Id.
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